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I. INTRODUCTION

For the last year that reliable statistics exist, approximately 1,221,585
abortions were performed in the United States.' Of those abortions, the National
Coalition of Abortion Providers estimates that 3000-5000 were partial birth
abortions.2 The debate over the legal and moral status of abortion has always been
contentious, so much so that it has been called the second American Civil War.3
Partial birth abortion has only served to make an already contentious debate
incendiary. Due in large part to public outcry and revulsion over partial birth4
abortion, thirty state legislatures had banned the procedure by June of 2000.
However, by that time, eighteen of those state statutes were either partially or

permanently enjoined or not enforced by state law enforcement officials.
On June 28, 2000, the United States Supreme Court again ventured into the
issue of abortion rights when it decided the case of Stenberg v. Carhart.6 The
central issue before the Court was whether a Nebraska statute,7 that made criminal

1

See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, ABORTION SURVEILLANCE - UNITED

STATES 1 (1996).
2

See Jill R. Radloff, Partial-BirthInfanticide: An Alternate Legal and Medical Route to Banning

Partial-BirthProcedures,83 MINN. L. REV. 1555, 1588 a.22 (1999).
3

See The Battle over Abortion: A Question of "Life" or "Choice," TIME, Mar. 9, 1998 at 165.

Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop likened the current state of the abortion debate to "the precursors of
a civil war, if not a civil war itself." He also stated that "nothing like it has separated our society since the
days of slavery."
4
Those states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin; See NARAL, WHO DECIDES? A STATE BY STATE REVIEW OF ABORTION AND
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 238 (2000). Many of the preceding state legislatures passed these statutes by

overwhelming majorities, containing pro-life and pro-choice legislators alike. For example, the Nebraska
statute passed its unicameral legislature with only one dissenting vote. Nebraska Legislative Journal, 95th
Leg., 1st Sess. 2609 (1997).
5
Those states were Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
See NARAL, supranote 4, at 238.
6
120 S.Ct. 2597 (2000).
The Nebraska statute at issue stated, "No partial birth abortion shall be performed in this state,
unless such procedure is necessary to save the life of the mother whose life is endangered by a physical
disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or
7

arising from the pregnancy itself." NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 28-328(l)

(1999). The statute defined partial birth

abortion as, "an abortion procedure in which the person performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally a
living unborn child before killing the unborn child and completing the delivery." Id. § 28-326(9) (1999). The
statute further defined "partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child" as,
"deliberately and intentionally delivering into the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion
thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that the person performing such procedure knows will kill
the unborn child and does kill the unborn child. Id. § 28-328(4) (1999).
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the performance of partial birth abortions, 8 violated the U.S. Constitution.9 Relying
heavily on the rationale of PlannedParenthood.v. Casey,1° and Roe v. Wade,1 the
Court held the statute unconstitutional on two bases. First, the Court invalidated the
Nebraska statute because it lacked any exception for the preservation of the health
of the mother. 2 Secondly, the Court held that the statute imposed an undue burden
on the woman's ability to choose a dilation and extraction
abortion, 13 "thereby
14
unduly burdening the right to choose abortion itself."
Consequently, the debate between pro-choice and pro-life factions
continues. The pro-choice movement adamantly defends partial birth abortion and
insists that any statutory ban against the procedure is unconstitutional. 5 Further,
many in the pro-choice camp speak of a Republican/Christian Coalition conspiracy
to impose their traditional ideals on women by banning all forms of abortion. 6
While, on the other end of the spectrum, the pro-life side of the debate views partial
birth abortion as nothing more than infanticide. 17 No matter what the individual
8

Abortion rights advocates are quick to point out that partial birth abortion is not a recognized

medical term. See Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369, 1376 (D. Ariz. 1997) (partial birth
abortion is not a medical term recognized in obstetrics or gynecology); Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283,
1297 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (stating all physicians that testified agreed that partial birth abortion is not a medical
term); Ann MacLean Massie, So-Called "Partial-BirthAbortion Bans: Bad Medicine? Maybe. Bad Law?
Definitely!, 59 U. PiTT. L. REV. 301, 313 (1998) (the term partial birth abortion does not exist in medical
terminology or literature); Radloff, supra note 2, at 1558 (stating that partial birth abortion is a term used in
conjunction with legislative efforts to ban the procedure); But see Richmond Med. Ctr. For Women v.
Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326, 327 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that both the American Medical Association and the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists recognize the term partial birth abortion); PartialBirth
Abortion Ban: Hearing on HR 1833 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong. 52-53 (1995)
[hereafter HR 1833 Hearing] (letter from Dr. Watson A. Bowes, Jr. to Sen. Orrin Hatch). In this letter, a
professor from the University of North Carolina Medical School wrote that, "[t]he term 'partial birth
abortion' is accurate as applied to the procedure ... [firom th[e] description, there is nothing misleading
about describing this procedure as a 'partial birth abortion' because in most cases the fetus is partially born
while alive and then dies as a direct result of the procedure... "Id.
9

See Stenberg, 120 S.Ct. at 2608.

10

505 U.S. 833 (1992).

11

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

12

See Stenberg, 120 S.Ct. at 2609.

13

A more thorough description of this procedure may be found in Part 11infra.

14

Stenberg, 120 S.Ct. at 2609.

is

A more detailed discussion of the argument over the constitutionality of partial birth abortion

appears in Part VI infra.
16

See DALLAS A. BLANCHARD, THE ANTI-ABORTION MOVEMENT AND THE RISE OF THE RELIGIOUS

RIGHT: FROM POLITE TO FIERY PROTEST 119 (1994) (claiming that the anti-abortion movement is a
movement of cultural fundamentalism, seeking to re-establish 'traditional' male-female relationships,
particularly the dependence of females on males); Rebecca L. Andrews, The Unconstitutionalityof State
Legislation Banning "Partial-Birth"Abortion,8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 521, 523 (1999) (the author claims that
the Religious Right and the Republican party "intend to rebuild the American family and 'family values' by
reestablishing traditional gender roles and relegating women to the home, barefoot and pregnant).
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas stated, "Today, the Court inexplicably holds that the
States cannot constitutionally prohibit a method of abortion that millions find hard to distinguish from
17
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reader's feelings are, there can be no doubt that the debate over partial birth
abortion is far from over.
This case comment proceeds in several parts. Among the topics discussed
are a brief discussion of relevant abortion procedures, the history of abortion, and
the facts and decision of Stenberg. This commentary will end with proposed
legislation to limit the use of partial birth abortion using Stenberg, other partial
birth abortion statutes, and other authors' commentaries as a guide.
II. THE ABORTION PROCEDURES
In order to place the Stenberg decision into proper perspective, the reader
must be familiar with the two forms of abortion at issue in the case. Currently, the
medical community recognizes six types of abortion procedures. Those procedures
are suction curettage,18 induction, 19 hysterotomy, 20 hysterectomy, 2' dilation and
evacuation (D & E), and dilation and extraction (D & X).

infanticide ....

.- Stenberg, 120 S.Ct. at 2636 (Thomas, J. dissenting); in a New York Times article,

Representative Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) called the number of abortions in the U.S. "a holocaust of
staggering proportions." Alison Mitchell, Both Sides Rally to Mark Abortion Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
1998, at A19; Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1319 n.38 (even some abortion practitioners believe partial birth
abortion is a "particularly hideous" procedure); HR 1833 Hearing at 116 (Prepared Statement of Helen M.
Alvare on Behalf of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities) Alvare
stated, "No reasonable person can disagree. once he or she has read a description ... of the partial birth
abortion method: it is one-fifth abortion and four-fifths infanticide. It kills a child when 80 percent of his or
her body is already outside the womb... That is a particularly heinous kind of killing because the victims are
small, weak and defenseless as the very youngest infants are." Id.
18
This procedure is the most common first trimester abortion. See Radloff. supra note 2. at 1588,
n.14. It is also synonymously known as suction aspiration. See id. It is commonly used from the sixth to the
twelfth week of gestation. but may be used up to the fifteenth week. See Carhart v. Stenberg, II F. Supp.
1099. 1102 (D. Neb. 1998). The procedure involves the dilation of the cervix by passing a series of plastic or
metal dilators, each slightly larger than the next. into the cervix. See Eva R. Rubin. THE ABORTION
CONTROVERSY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 64 (1994). When the cervix is dilated, a sterile tube attached to a
vacuum aspirator is inserted into the cervix. See id. The aspirator, which works on the same principles as a
vacuum cleaner, sucks the fetal tissue from the uterine wall. See id. The fragments are then drawn out and
down the tube by means of the vacuum pump. See id. A curette may also be used to scrape the endometrium,
thereby ensuring the removal of any remaining fetal tissue. See Carhart. II F. Supp. at 1102. The whole
process usually takes about five to seven minutes. See Rubin at 64. Except for cramping of the uterus, the
procedure is painless. See id.
19
This procedure is usually performed successfully in the second or third trimesters. See Radloff.
supra note 2. at 1588. n. 17. Using this method, the woman is given a local anesthetic to her abdominal area.
See Rubin. supra note 18. at 65. A long needle is then passed through the abdomen, and the physician draws
out some of the amniotic fluid. See id. A solution of saline. urea. or prostaglandin is then injected into the

amniotic cavity. See Carhart v. Stenberg. 972 F. Supp. 507. 516-517 (D. Neb. 1997). Over a period of several
hours, contractions will begin causing the dilation of the cervix. See id. at 517-518. Generally. the
contraction will be as strong as though the woman was experiencing natural childbirth. See Rubin, supra note

18. at 65. After eight to fifteen hours of labor. the fetus is expelled into a bedpan in the patient's bed. See id.
A hysterotomy is essentially a pre-term Cesarean section. See Radloff. supranote 2, at 1588 n.18.

20
21

A hysterectomy entails the surgical removal of the woman's uterus. See id. at 1588 n. 19.
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A.

The DilationandEvacuation

The primary abortion procedure used in the second trimester, or through
the thirteenth through fifteenth week of fetal gestation, is the dilation and
evacuation, or D & E.22 At this stage of gestation, the fetus is approximately six
inches long.23 The first step of this procedure requires the physician to dilate the
woman's cervix with the use of laminaria, which are osmotic dilators that absorb
natural moisture and expand to dilate the cervix. 24 The following day, the physician
removes the laminaria.2 5 After dilation, and because of the fetus' size, the physician
removes the fetus by dismembering it piece by piece.26 The physician grabs a fetal
extremity, usually an arm or a leg, with forceps and pulls it through the cervix,
tearing fetal parts from the body by means of traction.2 ' The fetus usually dies from
separated
blood loss, either from the removal of its limbs or because the physician
28
the fetus from the umbilical cord at the beginning of the procedure.
When all of the fetus' limbs have been ripped from its body and only the
head is left in utero, the physician must then collapse the skull to effect its
removal. 29 Removing the fetal head from the uterus is typically the most difficult
part of the D & E.30 This is due, in part, to the fact that the fetal head is too large to
pass through the cervical dilation.31 As a result, physicians have developed different
methods of decompressing the fetal head in order to effect its removal. 32 First, some
physicians prefer to grasp the fetal head with a clamp, crush it, and remove it in
pieces along with the skull contents. Second, the physician may choose to grasp the
fetal head, introduce a suction cannula into the skull, and suction out the
intracranial contents.33 At the end of the procedure, only a tray full of pieces
remains.'

22

See Carhart, I1 F. Supp. 2d at1103.

23

See Stenberg, 120 S.Ct. at 2638 n.3.

24

See Radloff, supra note 2, at 1588 n.15 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 30 F. Supp.2d 1157,

1161 (S.D. Iowa 1998).
25
See id.

26

See id. at 2637.

27

See id.

28

See id.
at 2638.

29

at 2638.
See id.

30

See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1064.

31

See id.

32

See id.

3

See id. at 1065.

34

See Stenberg, 120 S.Ct. at2638.
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The DilationandExtraction

The dilation and extraction, or D & X, is the partial birth abortion
procedure.35 It is also known synonymously as the "intact D & X," the "intact D
& E," 7 and the "brain suction procedure." 38 The partial birth abortion procedure is
usually performed in mid-second to late-second trimester pregnancies, and
sometimes even into the third trimester. 39 The procedure is generally performed on
fetuses ranging in development from fifteen to twenty-six weeks gestation.4
However, the procedure has been performed on fetuses up to the ninth month of
pregnancy.
One of the first, and most often ignored, aspects of the procedure is that it
requires three days to accomplish.4 2 First, the physician dilates the woman's cervix,
usually over a two-day period.43 Over this two-day period, up to twenty-five
dilators are forced into the woman's cervix at one time." After the cervix is
sufficiently dilated, the physician uses an ultrasound to determine the location of

As stated earlier in note 8 supra,there is no consensus in the legal or medical community as to the
proper term to be applied to the D & X procedure. One of the physicians who developed the procedure, Dr.
Martin Haskell, referred to this procedure as "dilation and extraction." See HR 1833 Hearingat 27-34 (letter
of Dr. Haskell introducing his procedure to the National Abortion Federation Risk Management Seminar,
September 13, 1992). The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists refers to the partial birth
abortion procedure as "intact dilation and extraction." Statement of Policy on Dilation and Extraction
(American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists), Jan 12, 1997; According to the American College of
Gynecologists, the partial birth abortion procedure contains four elements: 1) deliberate dilation of the cervix
over a sequence of days, 2) instrumental conversion of the fetus to footling breech, 3) breech extraction of the
body excepting the head, and 4) partial evacuation of the intracranial contents of a living fetus to affect
vaginal delivery of a dead but otherwise intact fetus. See Nancy G. Romer, The Medical Factsof PartialBirth
Abortion, 3-FALL NEXUS: J. OPINION 57, 58 (1998).
36
See Carhart,11 F. Supp. 2d at 1105; Gilmore, 144 F.3d at 327 (stating that partial birth abortion is
also known as intact D & X in the medical community).
37
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1036 (W.D. Wis. 1998) (noting that
the intact D & E is synonymous with the D & X or intact D & X); Women's Medical Prof l Corp. v.
Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 198 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that the D & X procedure is also known as the intact D
& E).
38
See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 198.
35

39

See Stenberg, 120 S.Ct. at 2638-39.

See Carhart,11 F. Supp. at 1105 (stating that the D & X procedure may be performed on fetuses
over 15 weeks gestation); HR 1833 Hearingat 6 (in his letter introducing the procedure, Dr. Haskell said he
"routinely performs this procedure on all patients 20 through 24 weeks [of gestation] with certain
exceptions." He also performs the procedure "on selected patients 25 through 26 weeks [of gestation].").
40

41

See Curtis R. Cook, Testimony of Dr. Curtis R. Cook at a Joint HearingBefore the US. Senate

Judiciary Committee, 14 ISSUES L. & MED. 65, 66 (1998) (hereafter Cook Testimony).
42
See id. at 67.
See id.
44

See id.
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the fetus' extremities.4 5
Next, the physician grabs the fetus by the feet and pulls the legs, torso,
6
shoulders, and arms out of the uterus and into the vaginal cavity The fetal skull
7
4
lodges in the cervix and the fetus is oriented spine up. At this point, the physician
slides his fingers along the back of the fetus. 4' The physician then hooks the
shoulders of the fetus with his index and ring fingers.49 While maintaining tension,
the physician takes a pair of blunt curved scissors and advances the tip along the
5°
fetal spine until he feels it make contact with the base of the fetal skull. While the
fetus is in this position, partially hanging outside the woman's body inches from
completed birth, the physician uses a pair of scissors to tear the back of the fetal
52
skull. 51 The physician then forces the scissors into the base of the fetal skull. At
53 Therefore, to
this point, the fetal head is too large to complete the delivery.
complete the procedure, a vacuum tube is placed in the perforation and the fetus'
brains are removed.54 With the suction catheter still in place, the physician applies
traction and removes the fetus completely from the patient.,55
Interestingly, despite their support of the partial birth abortion procedure,
pro-choice advocates bristle at the description of partial birth abortion in such
frank, straightforward terms?' Supporters of partial birth abortion prefer the
clinical description of the procedure, perhaps to make it sound sterile and medically
45

See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 199 (describing how the ultrasound is used to locate the fetal

extremities).
See id.
46
47

See HR 1833 Hearingat 110 (Prepared Statement of Nancy G. Romer, M.D.).

48

See id.

49

See id.

50

See id.

See Stenberg, 120 S.Ct. at 2639; see also Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 199 (describing the use of
scissors to perforate the fetal skull).
See HR 1833 Hearingat 110 (Prepared Statement of Nancy G. Rmer, M.D.).
52
51

53

See Stenberg, 120 S.Ct. at 2639.

.54

See id. (describing the use of a vacuum to remove the brain and intracranial contents of the fetus);

see also Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 199 (describing the use of a suction cannula to decompress the fetal head).
55

See HR 1833 Hearingat 110 (Prepared Statement of Nancy G. Romer, M.D.).

5

See, e.g. Andrews, supra note 16, at 536 n.1 (claiming that partial birth abortion is an

"inflammatory term" created by anti-choice activists to obscure the medical reality of the procedure). But see
Stenberg, 120 S.Ct. at 2646 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the term D & X is ambiguous on its face and
could encompass the D & E procedure, but partial birth abortion accurately describes the procedure); Planned
Parenthood v. Doyle, 44 F. Supp .2d 975, 979 (W. D. Wis. 1999) (physicians have equated partial birth
abortion with D & X); Little Rock Family Planning Services v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794, 795 (8th Cir. 1999)

(the court acknowledged that partial birth abortion is commonly known as intact dilation and extraction);
Gilmore, 144 F.3d at 327 (stating that partial birth abortion is otherwise known as intact D & X in the
medical community); Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1028 (W. D. Ky. 1998) (stating that partial
birth abortion is known as the D & X procedure in the medical community).
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sanctioned. 7 But no matter how the partial birth abortion procedure is described,
the emotional effects evoked after the performance of the procedure can be very
profound. Powerful emotional responses may be had by women on whom the
procedure was performed and on anyone witnessing the D & X procedure. An
obstetric nurse who witnessed a D & X abortion on a 26 2 week old fetus with
Down Syndrome described her experience in this way:
Dr. Haskell brought the ultrasound in and hooked it up so that he
could see the baby. On the ultrasound screen, I could see the heart
beat . . . [T]he baby's heartbeat was clearly visible on the
ultrasound screen. Dr. Haskell went in with forceps and grabbed
the baby's legs and pulled them down into the birth canal. Then,
he delivered the baby's body and the arms - everything but the
head. The doctor kept the head right inside the uterus . .. The
baby's little fingers were clasping and unclasping, and his little
feet were kicking. The doctor stuck the scissors in the back of his
head, and the baby's arms jerked out, like a startle reaction, like a
flinch, like a baby does when he thinks he is going to fall. The
doctor opened the scissors, stuck a high-powered suction tube into
the opening, and sucked the baby's brains out. Now the baby went
completely limp. I was completely unprepared for what I was
seeing. I almost threw up as I watched Dr. Haskell doing these
things. Next, Dr. Haskell delivered the baby's head. He cut the
umbilical cord and delivered the placenta. He threw the baby in a
57

See HR 1833 Hearing at 7-9 (letter of Dr. Haskell introducing his procedure to the National
Abortion Federation Risk Management Seminar, September 13, 1992). Dr. Martin Haskell, credited as the
inventor of the D & X procedure, described it in this way:
The cervix is scrubbed, anesthetized and grasped with a tenaculum . . . The surgical
assistant places an ultrasound probe on the patient's abdomen and scans the fetus . . .
The surgeon introduces a large grasping forcep . . . through the vaginal and cervical
canals into the corpus of the uterus . . . [Hle moves the tip of the instrument carefully
toward the fetal lower extremities ... [T]he surgeon ... firmly and reliably grasps[s] a
lower extremity. The surgeon applies firm traction to the instrument . . . and pulls the
extremity into the vagina ... With a lower extremity in the vagina, the surgeon uses his
fingers to deliver the opposite lower extremity, then the torso, the shoulders and the
upper extremities. The skull lodges in the cervical os. Usually, there is not enough
dilation for it to pass through. The fetus is oriented ... spine up. At this point, the ...
surgeon slides the fingers ... along the back of the fetus and hooks the shoulders of the
fetus with the index and ring fingers. Next, he slides the tip of the middle finger along
the spine towards the skull while applying traction to the shoulders and lower
extremities . . . While maintaining this tension . . . the surgeon takes a pair of blunt
curved Metzenbaum scissors ... He carefully advances the tip ... along the spine . ..
until he feels it contact the base of the skull . . . The surgeon then forces the scissors
into the base of the skull . . . [H]e spreads the scissors to enlarge the opening. The
surgeon removes the scissors and introduces a suction catheter into this hole and
evacuates the skull contents. With the catheter still in place, he applies traction to the
fetus, removing it completely from the patient. The surgeon finally removes the placenta
with forceps and scrapes the uterine walls ... The procedure ends.
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pan, along with the placenta and the instruments he had just used.
I saw the baby move in the pan. I asked another nurse, and she
said it was just reflexes... The woman asked to see her baby, so
they cleaned up the baby and put it in a blanket and handed it to
her. She cried the whole time. She kept saying, "I am so sorry,
please forgive me." I was crying too. I couldn't take it. That baby
boy had the most perfect angelic face I think I have ever seen in
my life. 8
C.

PartialBirth Abortion: Safe andNecessary?

Among the many areas of disagreement over partial birth abortion is
whether or not the procedure is both safe and necessary. Predictably, both sides of
the debate disagree over these two points. Many courts have concluded that the
partial birth abortion procedure is the safest second term abortion procedure in
many circumstances. -9 One reason courts have found the D & X procedure to be
safer than other abortion procedures is because it is less invasive than the D & E
procedure,' poses less risk to maternal health than induction procedures,6 1 and
poses less risk to maternal health than a hysterotomy or a hysterectomy. 62
58

HR 1833 Hearingat 18 (Statement ofBrenda Pratt Shafer).

59

See e.g. Stenberg, 120 S.Ct. at 2613 (in commenting on the state of disagreement over the relative
safety of the D & X procedure, the fact that those who believe the D & X is safer may tum out to be right);
see also Carhart,972 F.Supp. at 525. "The data suggests that the D & X procedure.., is appreciably safer
than all other forms of abortion during the relevant gestational time. Moreover... the D & X is 'an advance
in technology' because removing the fetus intact there is 'less instrument manipulation' and of course...
higher.., safety." Id at 525-526; Evans, 977 F.Supp. at 1296 (stating that six physicians agree that the D &
X "reduce[s] the risks associated with conventional D & Es"); Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1069 (reciting
testimony of Dr. George Goler, who testified that he "views [the D & X procedure] as an improvement over
the traditional D & E procedure"); HR 1833 Hearingat 248 (testimony of Dr. Warren Hem) (stating that an
advantage of the intact D & E is that it eliminates the risk of embolism of cerebral tissue into the woman's
bloodstream, which would be almost immediately fatal).
See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1070 (court states that the D & X does not require sharp
60
instruments to be inserted into the uterus, and therefore doesn't pose the same risk of cervical or uterine
lacerations as other procedures); Womens' Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 114 F. Supp. 2d 664, 688 (S.D. Ohio
2000) (court states that the D & X does not require sharp instruments to be inserted into the uterus, and
therefore doesn't pose the same risk of cervical or uterine lacerations as other procedures, due to the removal
of any need to crush the fetal skull and remove the pieces); Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore,
11 F.Supp. 2d 795, 809 (E.D. Va. 1998) (stating that it is safer for the physician to withdraw an intact fetus
because to do so reduces the number of instruments in the uterus which lowers the possibility of uterine
perforation, hemorrhaging and infection); HR 1833 Hearing at 248 (testimony of Dr. Warren Hem) (stating
that one of the possible advantages of the intact D & E is the reduction of the risk of perforation of the
uterus).
See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1070. (stating that injection of fluid to induce labor can cause
61
additional health risks to the woman, and noted that inductions cannot be used for every woman); Evans, 977
F.Supp. at 1316 (quoting Voinovich, 911 F.Supp. at 1070) (induction requires the woman to go through labor
and poses risks from the injection of fluid into the woman); Taft, 114 F.Supp.2d at 688 (injection of fluid into
the mother poses additional health risks).
See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1070. (stating that hysterotomy and hysterectomy are major,
62
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Many pro-choice commentators claim that partial birth abortion bans are
unconstitutional because they do not serve to further the life and health of the
mother, but serve only to ban a safer abortion method.63 These commentators claim
that partial birth abortion bans "compromise women's health and drastically limit
physician's discretion to choose the most medically appropriate abortion method
for their patients. '
However, despite the claims of partial birth abortion defenders, no
scientific data exists to establish its relative safety. 65 In fact, just the opposite may
be true. The American College of Gynecologists panel could identify no
circumstance in which this procedure would be the only option to save the life or
preserve the health of a woman.66 The AMA recommended that third trimester
abortions be performed only in cases of serious fetal anomalies incompatible with
life.67 In those cases, termination of the pregnancy could be accommodated without
sacrifice of the fetus. 68
When a mother experiences medical complications during the second
trimester of her pregnancy, what is required to save her life and protect her health is
not the death of her baby, but separation of the baby from the mother.69 At stages of
early viability, there is no danger in delivering the live baby and providing neonatal
care for the infant. 70 Fetal survival at less than twenty-four weeks gestation is
approximately 30%.71 However, between twenty-four to twenty-six weeks, fetal

traumatic surgeries); Taft, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 688 (stating hysterectomy and hysterotomy are major, traumatic
surgeries).
63
See Andrews, supra note 16, at 533.
64

Nadine Strossen & Caitlin Borgmann, The Carefully OrchestratedCampaign, 3-FALL NEXUs:
J.

OPINION 3, 10 (1998).
65

See Romer, supra note 35, at 61; In recent D & X litigation, a West Virginia federal district
judge
recognized that the D & X procedure has not been the subject of comparative clinical trials comparing it with
other abortion procedures. See Daniel v. Underwood, 102 F. Supp. 2d 680, 684-85 (S.D. W. Va. 2000).
However, the court went on to state that "[t]he lack of controlled medical studies and the conflicting medical
evidence do not.., demonstrate that the 'partial-birth abortion' ban does not need a health exception." Id. at
685. Another district court admitted that no peer review journal has published any studies measuring the
benefits of the D & X procedure. See Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. at 1068-1069. The court further stated that such
studies would make the asserted benefits of the D & X procedure more credible. See id. at 1069. In the end,
the court was convinced that the D & X procedure "appearfed]to pose less of a risk to maternal health than.
. . the D & E procedure... induction procedures... [and] hysterotomy or hysterectomy [procedures]." Id. at
1070 (emphasis added).
66
See Romer, supra note 35, at 58.
67
See id.
68

See id.

69

See Romer, supranote 35, at 60.

70

See id.; see also Cook Testimony, supra note 41, at 68 (stating that in the rare case of a severe

maternal condition requiring delivery, partial birth abortion is not necessary and is not preferred; only
separation from the mother is necessary).
71
See Romer, supra note 35, at 60.
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survival jumps significantly to between 50% to 75%72

In addition, other medical facts must be considered when deciding what
abortion procedure to use. Defenders of partial birth abortion claim the procedure is
used only in rare and unusual cases of severe fetal malformations and critically ill
women.7 However, Dr. Haskell admitted that "probably 20% are for genetic
reasons, and the other 80% are purely elective in the 20-24 week range of fetal
gestation." 4
Further, the late Dr. James McMahon, a Los Angeles physician who
performed thousands of partial birth abortions, admitted that he would perform the*
partial birth abortion procedure at all stages of fetal gestation for any reason.75
McMahon detailed performing more than 2,000 partial birth abortions, only 9% of
which he detailed as involving "maternal health indications," the most common of
which was maternal depression.7 6 The 56% he did for fetal indications were for
non-lethal fetal flaws such as Down Syndrome and cleft palate.77 Probably most
striking, at least one federal court quoted Dr. Haskell as admitting that "the D & X
is never medically necessary to save the life or preserve the health of a woman." 78
Similarly, many physicians and authors maintain that the partial birth
abortion procedure actually poses health risks to the mother. Perhaps the most
significant risk in the partial birth abortion procedure is the breaching of the fetus,
called the internal podalic position. 79 The technique of fetal rotation associated with
the procedure are largely abandoned in modem obstetrics because of the
unacceptable risks associated with it.an The breaching places the woman at greater
risk for both immediate bleeding and delayed infection complications. 8' Also,
women who have had a partial birth abortion often develop problems maintaining
2 In fact, the only advantage of partial birth abortion, if one
future pregnanciesY8
could consider it an advantage, is that it guarantees a dead baby by the time of

72

See id.

73

See id.

74

See id.

75

See id.
See Romer, supra note 35, at 60.

76

See James Bopp, Jr. & Curtis R. Cook, PartialBirth Abortion: The Final Frontierof Abortion
Jurisprudence,14 ISSUEs L. & MED. 3, 11 (1998).
78
Doyle, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 980; see also Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 873 (7th Cir. 1999)
77

(stating that the D & X is not essential to protect the health of any woman).
79

See id.at 61.

80

See Cook Testimony, supra note 41, at 67.

81

See id.

82

See id.; see also Romer, supra note 35, at 61 (stating that the dilation of the cervix has been

identified as a risk factor in cervical incompetence, a factor for complications in future pregnancies).
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delivery.83
Lastly, another issue that demands attention from partial birth abortion
supporters and opponents alike is the issue of fetal pain. Fetal pain is always given
as a reason by opponents of partial birth abortion for banning the procedure.
Predictably, both sides of the partial birth abortion debate disagree over this issue.
There is general consensus, in the medical community, that from at least
the twentieth week of fetal gestation and onward, fetal sensory organs throughout
the entire body react to touch and relay nervous impulses to the brain.84 However,
this is where the general consensus ends. Debate exists whether the mere fact that a
fetus reacts to stimuli is evidence that a fetus can feel pain.as Opponents of partial
birth abortion maintain that fetuses are clearly and obviously able to feel pain.6
However, other medical practitioners maintain that fetuses undergoing a partial
birth abortion, or any other abortion, are unable to feel pain.87 The result is that this
debate remains unresolved until this day.

83

See Cook Testimony, supranote 41, at 67.

84

See Radloff, supra note 2, at 1586.

85
See id; see also HR 1833 Hearingat 225 (letter of Norig Ellison, M. D.). Dr. Ellison states that
"very little is known about fetal response and consciousness to pain prior to 24 to 25 weeks gestation," but
that delivered infants are "exquisitely sensitive to pain stimulus." Id. at 249.
86
See e.g. Cook Testimony, supra note 41, at 68. In addressing the issue that a fetus does not feel
pain at gestational ages, Cook stated that this was "ridiculous." Id. He further stated that "in the course of my
practice... I have often observed babies five to six months gestation withdraw from needles and instruments,
much like a pain response." Id. Cook also reported that an English physician recently reported "an increase in
fetal pain response hormones during the course of these procedures at the same gestational ages." Id. Cook
also reported "observ[ing] the standard grimaces and withdrawals of neonates bom at six months gestation
like any other pain response in a more mature infant." Id.; see also Bopp & Cook, supra note 77, at 34
(stating that the partial birth abortion procedure inflicts pain on the fetus, which remains alive during the
cranial suction portion of the procedure); L. G. Almeda, Michigan's Ban on Partial Birth Abortions:
Balancing Competing Interests, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 685, 706 (1997) (quoting Dr. Robert J. White,
Partial Birth Abortion: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On the Constitution of the House Comm. On the
Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (June 15, 1995)) (stating that the partial birth abortion procedure is a
"painful experience for the human fetus ... at or beyond twenty weeks gestation ... [because the fetal]
nervous system is sufficiently advanced ... [and] is able to perceive and appreciate noxious stimuli which is
an intricate part of [the partial birth abortion] procedure." Id.
87
See HR 1833 Hearing at 248-49 (written statement of Dr. Warren Hem) Dr. Hem states that fetal
neurological development well into the early part of the third trimester is insufficient for the fetus to
experience pain. Id. Further, he stated that "an adequate neural substrate for experienced pain does not exist
until about the seventh month of pregnancy (thirty weeks) ... " Id. at 249; see also Karen E. Walther, Partial
Birth Abortion: Should Moral Judgment Prevail Over Medical Judgment?, 31 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 693, 723
(2000). The author states that courts have acknowledged that preventing unnecessary cruelty to the fetus is
part of the state's interest in protecting fetal life, but medical evidence presented on the issue of fetal pain is
inconclusive. See id. The author also points out that courts have found the D & X procedure is no more cruel
than the D & E method because both often require the same procedures. See id. (citing Voinovich, 911 F.
Supp. at 1074 n.29 (court stated that it "fails to see how the [D & X] is more cruel than the D & E procedure
- which involves the dismemberment of the fetus and, sometimes, the crushing of its skull.")).
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III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ABORTION: ACCEPTED OR NOT?
A.

An HistoricalPerspective
1.

Abortion in Antiquity

The argument over the legitimacy of abortion existed long before the
modem day. This is, because, it seems that for almost as long as there has beenpregnancy, there has been abortion. In ancient Greece, for example, followers of
the Stoic philosophy believed that abortion should be allowed up to the moment of
birth.88 The Pythagoreans, however, vehemently opposed this belief.8 9 They
believed that the soul entered the body at the moment of conception and therefore,
to abort a fetus was to commit murder. 90 Early Roman law was silent on the subject
of abortion. 9' In fact, abortion and infanticide was common in the Roman Empire,
especially among the upper class. 92
2.

Abortion and English Common Law

In examining the roots of historical American
must examine its roots in English common law.93 In
wrote one of the first compilations of criminal law in
murder, Hawkins considered whether or not abortion
wrote:

views toward abortion, one
England, William Hawkins
1738.9 In his discussion of
should be so classified. He

And it was anciently holden, That the causing of an Abortion by
giving a Potion to, or striking, a Woman big with Child, was
Murder: But at this Day, it is said to be a great [misdemeanor]
only, and not Murder, unless the Child be bom alive, and die
thereof, in which Case it seems clearly to be Murder,
notwithstanding some opinions to the contrary. And in this
Respect also, the Common Law seems to be agreeable to the
Mosaical, which as to the Purpose is thus expressed, If Men strive
and hurt a Woman with Child, so that her Fruit depart from her,
and yet no Mischief follows, he shall be surely punished,
according to the Woman's Husband will lay upon him, and he
88

See Rubin, supra note 18, at3.

89

See id.

90

See id.

91

See id.

92

See id.

93

See Rubin, supra note 18, at 6.

94

See id.
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shall pay as the Judges determine; And if any Mischief follow,
then thou shalt give Life for Life. 95
One possible reading of the text of that passage would seem to show that,
at least in England in 1762, abortion was illegal. Presumably, the statute would
have applied to "abortions" that occurred before the event of the quickening. Also,
it was only the result of the abortion procedure that decided the severity of the
punishment. If the one performing the abortion procedure succeeded in aborting the
fetus in the womb, then it was a misdemeanor punishable at law for which damages
could be awarded. But if the baby was born alive because of the abortion procedure
and subsequently died, it was considered murder to be punished by death.
Yet, many commentators insist that abortion was legal under common
law.9 They point out that English common law adopted the doctrine of
"quickening," or the first noticeable movement of the fetus in the woman's
womb.9 7 Only an abortion performed after quickening could bring about
punishment, but not one performed before. 98 After the bellwether event of the
quickening, the woman incurred a moral duty to continue the pregnancy through
until birth. 99 In line with this philosophy, England passed a statutory ban on
10 1
abortions in 1803.100 In that year, Parliament passed Lord Ellenborough's Act,
which was a comprehensive crime control statute. It made any attempt to induce an
abortion after quickening a felony. 0 2
3.

Overview of Abortion in America

Abortion rights supporters frequently point out that abortion was not
uncommon in early America.10 3 Herbal abortifacientst 4 were widely known, and
cookbooks and women's diaries of the era contained recipes for medicines., °5
Studies indicate that midwives supplied abortifacient compounds to pregnant

95

WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 80

(1762) (reprinted in Rubin,

supra note 18, at 6).
96See

LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME 8(1997).

97

See Rubin, supranote 18, at 4; see also REAGAN, supranote 96, at 8.

98

See Rubin, supranote 18, at 4.

99

See REAGAN, supra note 96, at 9.

100

See id. at 295.

101

See id.

102

See id.

103

By "early America," the author means the period from 1607 to 1857.

104

An abortifacient is anything that can induce an abortion.
See Brief of 281 American Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Webster v.

105

Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605) (reprinted in Rubin, supranote 18, at 11).
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women. 6 Moreover, such events were described as routine and met with no
particular disapproval. °7 Indeed, commentators claim that abortions induced by
drugs, herbal potions and surgical techniques was common, but unregulated., °8
Further, during this time in American history, commentators insist that
abortion was a "woman's business" and "family business." 10 9 Not until 1821 was
the first abortion law passed in America.110 In that year, Connecticut brought
abortion under the rubric of its criminal law.11 This law, generally addressing
murder by poisoning, made it a crime to give a woman a "poisonous substance" in
order to induce a miscarriage1 12
Additionally, abortion rights commentators claim that the trend toward
criminalization of abortion began in the mid-1800s.13 In 1857, the newly formed
American Medical Association (AMA) began a crusade to eliminate the concept of
quickening and make all abortions illegal at all stages of pregnancy. 14 Further,
abortion rights authors claim that the AMA's motivation to criminalize abortions
was its desire to gain professional power, control the practice of medicine, and
squeeze out competition, especially from homeopaths and midwives.115
But abortion rights authors do not stop there. These authors also attribute
sexism, racism, xenophobia and anti-Catholicism as motivations for criminalizing
abortions in mid-nineteenth century America. 16 The motivation of these antiabortion activists during this time was the fear that immigrant families, many of
them Catholic and many non-white, would outproduce the native-born white
"Yankees" and thus, usurp their political power. 17 Also, by criminalizing abortion,
white, native-born legislators gained a weapon to use against women who had been
agitating for political and personal reforms.' 18 In the period from 1880 to 1930,
abortions were criminalized in some form in all fifty states. 1 9 Starting in the 1950s,

106

See id.

107

See id.

108

See Rubin, supra note 18, at 1.

109

See id.

110

See id.

ill

See id.

112

See id.

113

See generally REAGAN, supra note 96, at 10.

114

See id. at 10, 13.

115

See id.

116

See generally id. at 11, 13.

117

See id.

118

See REAGAN, supranote 96, at 13.

119

See id.
at 14.
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however, physician-led movements to decriminalize abortion began. 20
Consequently, by the time of the Roe v. Wade decision, states differed in their
treatment of abortion, but the majority still maintained some kind of restriction. 121
4.

Selected Modem Abortion Jurisprudence and Philosophy

However, many commentators disagree with the contention that the right
to abortion is universally accepted, among them Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia. In his dissent in Roe v. Wade, then-Justice Rehnquist stated that the
decision to artificially divide the pregnancy into trimesters and outline the
restrictions that a state may impose was nothing more than "judicial legislation"
and did not reflect the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment.'2 2 In
fact, to reach its result, the majority had to find within the Fourteenth Amendment a
right that was "apparently completely unknown to the drafters of the
Amendment."' 23
Further, Justice Rehnquist stated that the mere fact that a majority of the
states had some kind of restriction on abortion was a good indication that the right
"[was] not so deeply rooted in the traditions of the conscience of our people as to
be ranked fundamental.' 24 Rehnquist further asserted that even though views on
abortion were changing by that time, the fact that debate existed was evidence "that
the right to an abortion is not so universally accepted as [Roe] would have us
believe.' 25
Rehnquist also pointed out that there were thirty-six abortion restricting
statutes in existence at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. 26
He concluded that there was obviously no question of the validity of any of these
statutes at the time of the adopting of the Amendment. 127 Therefore, the only
conclusion one could make was that the Framers of the Amendment did not mean
120

See id at 15.

121

The states and jurisdictions could be broken down into five distinct groups based on their

treatment of abortion. The states that allowed abortion for any reason were Alaska, D.C., Hawaii, New York,
and Washington. The states that permitted abortion only to protect the woman's physical and mental health
were Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, and Virginia. Mississippi permitted abortion to preserve the woman's life
and in cases of rape. The states that permitted abortion only to preserve the life of the mother were Alabama,
Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. States that prohibited
all abortions were Louisiana, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania. See MATTHEw E. WEINSTEIN, ABORTION
RATES IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (1996).
122
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
123

Id.

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

See id. at 174-75.

127

Lee Roe, 410 U.S. at 177 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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28

to withdraw from the states the power to regulate abortion.
Justice Scalia is no less adamant about the non-existence of the
constitutional right to an abortion. In his dissenting opinion in Casey, he stated that
"the States may, if they wish, permit abortion on demand, but the Constitution does
not require them to do so., 129 Further, Scalia does not agree that abortion is a right
protected by the Constitution. He believes this for two main reasons. First, the
Constitution says "absolutely nothing about it."'" Second, Scalia, like Rehnquist,
sees that the "longstanding traditions of American society have permitted
[abortion] to be legally proscribed.''. Similarly, Scalia asserts that the "right" of
privacy
found in the Constitution that made abortion a fundamental right does not
l 2
exist.1

However, Scalia did not stop there. In poking his finger in the eye of the
Casey majority by using its own words, he said the following:
The right to abort, we are told, inheres in "liberty" because it is
among "a person's most basic decisions," it involves a "most
intimate and personal choice," it is "central to personal dignity and
autonomy," it "originates within the zone of conscience and
belief," it is "too intimate and personal" for state interference, it
reflects "intimate views" of a "deep, personal character," it
involves "intimate relationships," and notions of "personal
autonomy and bodily integrity," and it concerns a particularly
"important decision." But it is obvious that anyone applying
"reasoned judgment" that the same adjectives can be applied to
many forms of conduct that this Court... has held are not entitled
to Constitutional protection - because, like abortion, they are
forms of conduct that have long been criminalized in American
society. Those adjectives might be applied, for example, to
homosexual sodomy, polygamy, adult incest, and suicide, all of
which are equally "intimate" and "deep[ly] personal" decisions
involving "personal autonomy and bodily integrity," and all of
which can constitutionally be proscribed because it is our
unquestioned Constitutional tradition that they are proscribable."a

128

See id.

129

Casey, 505 U.S. at 979 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

130

Id. at 980.

131

Id.

See id. at 981 (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (stating that in
defining "liberty," we may not disregard a specific, "relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to,
the asserted right....")).
133
Id at 983-984 (citations omitted).
132
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The History of Partial Birth Abortion

The historical examination of this commentary now turns to partial birth
abortion. To put it succinctly, it possesses a less than impressive historical
pedigree. The procedure was largely unknown until September 1992. It was then
that Dr. Martin Haskell'34 introduced his procedure in a letter to the National
Abortion Risk Management Seminar.as
What is the result? The result depends on one's opinion of abortion. If one
subscribes to the pro-choice ideology, then partial birth abortion is nothing more
than a modem variation of a procedure that was accepted at common law, and was
historically known and accepted by the Framers of the Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, if one subscribes to the Rehnquist/Scalia school
of thought, partial birth abortion is a modem variation of a procedure unknown to
the framers of the Constitution and Fourteenth Amendment, has a history of
accepted proscription, and by the very fact that debate exists over it, the right to
partial birth abortion is not so widely accepted as pro-choice advocates would want
the public to believe.
B.

Roe. v. Wade

With its 1974 decision in Roe v. Wade,1as the U.S. Supreme Court forever
changed the face of the abortion debate in America. The Roe Court determined that
the right of privacy found throughout the U.S. Constitution was "broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."1' 37 The
Court found the Texas statute at issue in the case unconstitutional because it
violated the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protecting the right
to privacy against state action.1 38 Although not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution, the Court reasoned that certain "zones of privacy" existed sufficiently
in the Constitution to support the woman's right to choose. 139 Justice Blackmun
found these roots of privacy in the First Amendment, 140 the Fourth and Fifth
143
1 42
Amendments, 141 in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, the Ninth Amendment,

134

See Bopp & Cook, supra note 77, at 7 (as of 1998, Dr. Haskell was reported to have performed

over 1,000 partial birth abortions).
135
See supra note 57.
138

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

137

Id.at 153.

138

See id. at 164.

139

See id.at 152.

140

See id.(citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).

141

See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389

U.S. 347, 350 (1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)).
142
See id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965)).
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and in the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.
45
The Roe Court then went on to divide the pregnancy into trimesters.1 In
the first trimester, the woman, in consultation with her physician, had the right to
1
terminate her pregnancy without interference from the state. 4 In the second
trimester, the state could begin to regulate abortion, but only so far as it related to
and preserved matemal health.147 In the third trimester, however, the state could
regulate or even proscribe abortion, except where necessary to preserve the life or
health of the woman. 1'
However, the Roe Court did recognize that the state would eventually gain
a compelling interest in protecting fetal life. As Justice Blackmun stated, the
"compelling point" in the pregnancy that allowed the state to proscribe abortion
was viability. 149 However, the Court deemed abortion a fundamental right with any
1
further attempt to regulate it subject to strict scrutiny. 50
C.

The Abortion on DemandEra

For approximately fifteen years after Roe, abortion decisions handed down
15
by the Supreme Court greatly enhanced the power and reach of Roe. * For
5 2 the Court struck down a state
example, in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,"
statute requiring spousal and parental consent before a woman could obtain an
abortion.'5 3 The Court also struck down a statute imposing criminal penalties on
physicians failing to protect the life and health of the fetus. 54 Lastly, the Court
invalidated a state ban on the use of saline amniocentesis as an abortion
technique.1"

143

See id (citing Griswold,381 U.S. at 486).

144

See id (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).

145

See id. at 164-165.

146
147

See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
See id.

148

See id. at 163-64.

149

See id at 163.

150

See id at 154-56.
See Stenberg, 120 S.Ct. at 2635 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Justice Thomas described the period
151
between 1976 and 1989 as an "era ofCourt-mandated abortion on demand" and an "unrestrained imposition
of the Court's own, extraconstitutional value preferences on the American people.").
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
152
See id at 69, 74 (stating that the state could not delegate to a spouse or parent a veto power which
is constitutionally prohibited from exercising during the woman's first trimester of pregnancy).
itself
the state
id at 83-84 (this section of the Missouri statute deemed that a physician could be charged with
See
154
manslaughter for failure to exercise professional care to preserve fetal life and health).
153

155

See id at 79.
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Similarly, other post-Roe abortion decisions furthered the initial reach of
Roe v. Wade. In Bellotti v. Baird,56 the Supreme Court declared parental veto
power over a minor's abortion unconstitutional without a judicial bypass option.'5
In Colautti v. Franklin,156 the Court struck down a statute requiring a physician to
be responsible for the health and potential life of a viable fetus as unconstitutionally
vague.1 59
One of the most substantial abortion on demand cases was City ofAkron v.
Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health.160 In Akron, the Court struck down a statute
requiring all second trimester abortion to be performed in hospitals.' 61 But the
Court in Akron did not stop there. It also invalidated parental notification
provisions for minors, 62 invalidated informed consent guidelines for physicians,'
invalidated state requirement of 24-hour waiting periods before abortions,'5 4 and
invalidated guidelines requiring humane and sanitary disposal of fetal remains as
unconstitutionally vague. 5 Decided along with Akron was Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Ashcroft.' 6 In Ashcroft, the Court invalidated a Missouri statutory
that all abortions after twelve weeks of gestation be performed in
requirement
167
hospitals.
The Supreme Court dealt another victory to those favoring abortion on
demand in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetriciansand Gynecologists."
In Thornburgh, the Court overturned Pennsylvania statutes requiring extensive
lectures on fetal viability and risks of abortion procedures,' 169 "intrusive" record
keeping provisions, 17° a mandated state waiting period before abortions, 17' the
presence of a second physician when abortions were performed without a medical156

443 U.S. 622 (1979).

157

See id. at 643-44.

15

439 U.S. 379 (1979).

159

See id. at 390-92, 397.

160

462 U.S. 416 (1983).

161

See id. at 431-33.

162

See id. at 439-40.

163

See id. at 445.

164

See id. at 449-50.

165

See Akron, 462 U.S. at 451.

166

462 U.S. 476 (1983).

167

See id. at 481-82.
476 U.S. 747 (1986).

169

See id. at 764.

170

See id. at 765-68.

171

See id. at 760-62.
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exception, 172 and a statute outlining the physician's duty to protect the
emergency
fetus. 17 3
D.

Puttingthe Brakes on Abortion on Demand

Perhaps due to a conservative turn in the Supreme Court's ideology, more
and more state restrictions on abortions began to be upheld by the end of the 1980s.
The first case to put the brakes on abortion on demand was Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services.17 4 This case dealt with an amended Missouri statute
regarding unborn children and abortions. 17' Here, the Court stated that private
physicians and their patients do not have a constitutional right to access public
hospitals for abortions.176 The Court also upheld guidelines that required physicians
to perform viability tests on fetuses after the twentieth week of gestation.'77
Further, the Court upheld a ban that prohibited the use of state funds to counsel
women regarding medically unnecessary abortions. 178 But probably most
interestingly, the majority did not offer an opinion of the preamble of the Missouri
law that found "life ...begins at conception., 179 The Court found that these words
did not regulate abortion or favor childbirth over abortion. 1"
However, arguably the most important post-Roe abortion decision was
Casey.18' For the first time, the Court was faced with the opportunity to overturn
Roe. However, the court stressed the importance of honoring stare decisis in
reaffirming the essential holding of Roe.8 2 The Court did, however, announce a
new standard for reviewing state regulation of abortion. The Court abandoned the
strict scrutiny analysis, replacing it with an "undue burden" analysis."a In
articulating the new analysis, the Court admitted that not every abortion regulation
was necessarily unfounded. 1 4 Under the undue burden analysis, an abortion
172

See id.
at 769-71.

173

See Thornburgh,476 U.S. at 768-69.

174
175

492 U.S. 490 (1989).
See id. at 500.

176

See id.
at510.

177

See id.
at 515-20.

178

Seeid.at 511-13.

179

Webster,492 U.S. at 504-07.

180

See id.
at 506.

181

505 U.S. 833 (1992).

182

See id at 854-55. Justice O'Connor stated, "[When this Court reexamines a prior holding...

[w]e may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability ....
Although Roe has engendered opposition, it has in no sense proven unworkable."
183

See id. at 874.

184

See id. at 876; Allison D. Gough, Banning PartialBirth Abortion: Drafting a Constitutionally
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regulating statute is invalid only if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial
85
obstacle in the path of the woman seeking the abortion before fetal viability.
Further, the court jettisoned the rigid trimester framework announced in
Roe and made viability the bellwether event for abortion regulation. 1 6 Therefore, in
applying the undue burden analysis, the issue becomes whether the particular
abortion regulation will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's decision to
have an abortion in the majority of the cases in which the regulation is relevant. 187
On the other hand, abortion regulations that do no more than create a "structural
mechanism" for which the State may express its respect for life are permissible if
they do not impose a substantial obstacle.1 88
The Court upheld a number of abortion restrictions in the Pennsylvania
statute at issue in Casey. First, it upheld a lengthy informed consent provision.189
Next, the Court upheld a 24-hour waiting period before obtaining an abortion,
overruling that portion of Akron that forbade waiting periods.'9 The Court also
upheld the state mandated record keeping and reporting requirements. 91
However, the Court invalidated a number of provisions of the statute. First,
it invalidated a portion of the otherwise acceptable reporting statute that required
reporting of the excuse of a married woman for not informing her husband of the
abortion. 92 Lastly, the Court invalidated the spousal notification section of the
statute as a substantial burden that would be 193
tantamount to a veto by the husband
over the woman's choice to have an abortion.
IV. STENBERG V. CARHART: A PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 3, 1997, the Nebraska state legislature passed Legislative Bill 23
(LB 23) which prohibited partial birth abortions in Nebraska.' 94 The bill, however,
included an exception that the procedure could be performed if the life of the
mother was "endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury,
including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the
Acceptable Statute, 24 U. DAYTON L. REv. 187, 193 (1998).
185
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.

See id. at 873. Justice O'Connor stated that the trimester framework "misconceive[d] the
nature of

the woman's interest; and in practice it undervalue[d] the [sitate's interest in potential life.
187

See id.

188

See id. at 877.

189

See id.at 881-85.

190

See id. at 885.

191

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 900-01.

192

See id. at 901.

193

See id. at 897-98.
See Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507, 510 (D. Neb. 1997).
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pregnancy itself."' 195 On June 9, 1997, Nebraska's governor signed LB 23 into
96
law.'
A.

The DistrictCourt's Decision

Shortly after the passage of LB 23 into law, Dr. LeRoy Carhart filed a
complaint in the federal district court of Nebraska challenging the constitutionality
of the statute. 9 7 In response, the district court granted a temporary restraining
order, followed by a preliminary injunction.19 a Dr. Carhart challenged the
constitutionality of the Nebraska statute on two grounds. First, he argued that the
statute placed an undue burden on himself and his patients in two ways.199
Carhart's first claim was that the D & X procedure is, in certain
circumstances, the safest abortion procedure for some women.20 0 Therefore,
according to Carhart, banning the D & X procedure placed an undue burden on
women seeking an abortion.2 ' Further, Carhart claimed that since the Nebraska
statute prohibited vaginally delivering a "substantial portion" of the fetus, it also
applied to the D & E procedure. °2 Because the D & E procedure is the most widely
abortions, the ban also placed an
used abortion procedure used in second trimester
203
undue burden on women seeking abortions.
The second constitutional argument Carhart offered in attacking the
Nebraska statute was that it was unconstitutionally vague. 2 ' The statute was vague,
he argued, because it was unclear what "substantial portion" meant.205
Subsequently, the District Court for the District of Nebraska initially enjoined the
Nebraska statute from enforcement.20 6 Then, at trial on the merits, the district court
found the Nebraska statute unconstitutional as applied to Dr. Carhart.207 The court

195

Id.; see also NEB.REV. STAT. § 28-328(l) (1999).

196

197

See Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1145 (8th Cir. 1999).
See id.

198

See id.

199
200

See id.at 1146.
See id.at 1146.

201

See Carhart,192 F.3d at 1146.

202

See id.

203

See id.

204

See id.

205

See id.

206

See Carhart, 972 F. Supp. at 53 1.

207

A law may be challenged as unconstitutional in two ways, it may either be challenged "as applied"

or "facially." See id at 1119 (quoting Ada v. Guam Soc. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011,
dissenting). "If the law is judged unconstitutional on facts peculiar to the plaintiff,
1012-13 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
(quoting Ada at 1013). But if the law is found unconstitutional
then the law is unconstitutional as applied." Id.
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made extensive findings of fact, in which it determined that the D & X procedure is
the safest procedure for women in some circumstances. 20 8
First, the court found that the Nebraska law prohibited the performing of
the D &X procedure on ten to twenty women per year, based on the number of
procedures Carhart performed in 1996.209 The court found that the ban had a "direct
and immediate impact" upon Carhart and about 190 patients.210 As a result, the
court determined an undue burden existed on these women because the law had the
effect of subjecting Carhart's patients to an appreciably greater risk of injury or
death than would be the case if Carhart could perform the D & X procedure.21'
However, the court found that the effects of the Nebraska partial birth
abortion ban went far beyond the 10-20 patients per year that could be affected. 2
The court found that the Nebraska statute also prohibited the use of the D & E
procedure.2 13 As a result, the court reasoned that the Nebraska statute impacted
every woman seeking an abortion from the 16tl to the 20'dh week of gestation. 214 In
other words, the court found that the Nebraska partial birth abortion ban prohibited
Dr. Carhart from using the D & E procedure on up to 190 women per year.215 As a
result, the statute placed an undue burden in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion.218
Lastly, the district court found the Nebraska statute void because of
vagueness.2 17 The court found that no one, including the state's expert witnesses,
understood what the term "substantial portion" in the Nebraska partial birth
abortion ban meant.2 8

regardless of how it might be applied to a particular plaintiff, then the law is facially unconstitutional. Id. If a
law is unconstitutional as applied, it cannot be enforced against the plaintiff or others similarly situated, but
the law is otherwise generally enforceable. See id.
208
In the opinion, the district court stated that "Nebraska's ban ... has the effect of subjecting his
patients to an appreciably greater risk of injury or death than would be the case if these women could rely
upon Carhart to do his variant of the banned procedure when medically advisable." Carhar, 972 F. Supp. at
524-25. Further, the court went on to say that "[tihe data suggests that the D & X procedure... is appreciably
safer than all other forms of abortion during the relevant gestational time. Id. at 525.
209

See Carhart, 972 F. Supp. at 520.

210

See id.

211

See Carhart, II F. Supp. 2d at 1122-23.

212

See id. at 1127.

213

See id.

214

See id.

215

See id.

216

See Carhart, II F. Supp. 2d at 1127.

217

See id.at 1131-32.

218

See id.at1131.
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The CircuitCourt of-Appeals'Decision

Upon appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Nebraska
2 19
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the term "substantial portion"
court.
district
statute encompassed the D & E procedure as well as the D &
the
Nebraska
used in
°
the court found that the Nebraska statute did not limit all
Although
X procedure?2
second trimester abortions, it found the statute broad enough to prohibit the most
common second trimester abortion procedure, which is the D & E. 21 In doing so,
the Nebraska statute imposed an undue burden on a woman's right to choose an
abortion.'
C.

The Supreme Court'sDecision

Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the language of the Nebraska
statute did not distinguish between the D & X procedure and the D & E
procedure ? 23 In this portion of the decision, Justice Breyer, writing for the
majority, focused on the "substantial portion" language of the statute. The majority
reasoned that the D & E would often require the physician to pull a substantial
portion of the fetus, such as an arm or a leg, into the vagina prior to the death of the
fetus.22 4 Further, the majority pointed out that the events leading up to the
dismemberment of the fetus do not occur until after a portion of the fetus is pulled
into the vagina.225
Moreover, the majority reasoned that both the D & X and D & E
procedures can involve the introduction of a "substantial portion" of the fetus into
the vagina.226 Therefore, since the statute applied to both the D & E and D & X
procedures, the Nebraska statute placed a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion and therefore, placed an undue burden on the woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy before viability 27 However, two of the dissenters,
Justices Thomas and Kennedy, strongly disagreed with the majority's construction
of the Nebraska partial birth abortion ban. 28 Both Thomas and Kennedy undertook
219

See Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1152.

220

See id. at 1150.

221

See id. at 1151.

222

See id.

223

See Stenberg, 120 S.Ct. at 2614.

224

See id.at 2613.

225

See id.

226

See id.

227

See generally id. (quoting Casey, 505 U. S. at 877).

See generally Stenberg, 120 S.Ct. at 2640-44 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (providing a narrowing
construction of the Nebraska partial birth abortion ban to avoid constitutional infirmities); see also id at
2631-34 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (providing narrowing construction ofNebraska statute).
228
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a construction of the Nebraska statute to show how it could be narrowly construed
to avoid constitutional infirmities.2 29
The Court also invalidated the Nebraska statute on a second basis. The
Court agreed with the findings of the district court that the D & X procedure
obviates the health risks to the woman that undergoes the procedure. 2' The
majority reasoned that the state could not subject a woman's health to significant
risks by forcing her to use "[a] riskier method of abortion., 231 Therefore, since the
D & X procedure is the safer method of late term abortion, the Nebraska statute
required a health exception to pass Constitutional muster.23 2
V. THE WEST VIRGINIA STATUTE INVALIDATED

On July 7, 2000, the U.S. District Court for the Southem District of West
Virginia invalidated the West Virginia partial birth abortion ban in the case of
Daniel v. Underwood. 3 This ban was part of the Women's Access to Health Care
Act, located in Chapter 33, Article 42 of the West Virginia Code. 3 4 Specifically,
the court invalidated §§ 33-42-3(3)-(5) and 33-42-8.235 The district court originally
229

See id.

230

See id. at 2612

231

See id. at 2609.

232

See id. at 2612.

233

102 F. Supp. 2d 680 (S. D. W. Va.2000).

234

See W. VA. CODE §§ 33-42-1 to 8 (1998).

235

The relevant portions of the West Virginia statute are as follows:

(3) "Partial-birth abortion" means an abortion in which the person performing the
abortion partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus and
completing the delivery
(4) "Physician performing a partial birth abortion" means a doctor of medicine or
osteopathy legally authorized to practice medicine or surgery in West Virginia, or any
other individual who is legally authorized by the state to perform abortions: Provided,
[t]hat any individual who is not a physician or not otherwise legally authorized by the
state to perform abortions, but who nevertheless directly performs a partial-birth
abortion, is subject to the provisions of this article.
(5) "Vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus" means deliberately and
intentionally delivering into the vagina a living fetus, or a substantial portion thereof,
for the purpose of performing a procedure that the physician or person delivering the
living fetus knows will kill the fetus, and kills the fetus.
Id. § 33-42-3(3) to (5) (1998);
(a) Any person, who knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and thereby kills a
human fetus is guilty of a felony and shall be fined not less than ten thousand dollars,
nor more than fifty thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both
fined and imprisoned. This section does not apply to a partial-birth abortion that is
necessary to save the life of a mother when her life is endangered by a physical disorder,
illness or injury.
(b) A physician charged pursuant to this section may seek a hearing before the West
Virginia board of medicine on the issue of whether the physician's act was necessary to
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certified the question of the construction of the partial birth ban to the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.2 38 The West Virginia high court, however,
returned the certified question to the district court without comment. As a result,
the district court held off its decision whether or not to grant summary judgment
until the U.S. Supreme Court had decided Stenberg.
A.

Danielv. Underwood: Thefacts of the case

In Daniel,the plaintiffs, represented by Dr. William D. Daniel, filed suit in
the district court for the Southern District of West Virginia to enjoin enforcement
of the state ban on partial birth abortion.2 3 7 The plaintiffs alleged that the West
Virginia ban violated "a woman's right to privacy" as set forth in Roe v. Wade.'
The plaintiffs set forth four allegations. First, the plaintiffs alleged that the West
Virginia statute "infringe[d] upon a woman's bodily integrity without any
' Second, the plaintiffs alleged that
compelling or even legitimate state interest."239
the statute imposed an "undue burden on a woman's right to choose an abortion."24
Third, they alleged the statute forbade abortion methods that "could be the safest in
certain circumstances."24' 1 Lastly, the plaintiffs alleged that the statute lacked a
health or medical emergency exception.242
The plaintiffs included a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and preliminary injunction with their complaint.2 After a hearing, the court issued
the TRO, temporarily restraining the enforcement of West Virginia Code sections
33-42-3(3) through (5) and 33-42-8.244
save the life of a mother pursuant to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section. The
findings of the board of medicine are admissible on this issue at the trial of the
physician. Upon a motion by the defendant, the court shall delay the beginning of the
trial for not more than thirty days to permit the board of medicine hearing to take place.
(c) No woman may be prosecuted under the provisions of this section for having a
partial-birth abortion, nor may she be prosecuted for conspiring to violate the provisions
of this section.
Id. § 33-42-8 (1998).

238
See W. VA. CODE § 55-IA-3 (1998). This is the section of the West Virginia Code that allows for
the certification of questions by another court to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. However, the
authority of the court to answer is discretionary. The statute states in relevant part that "[t]he supreme court of
appeals ofWest Virginia may answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States... ?'Id.
(emphasis added).
237
See Daniel, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 681.
238

See id

239

See id.

240

See id.

241

See id.

242

See Daniel,102 F. Supp. 2d at 681.

243

See id.

244

See id.
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The DistrictCourt'sDecision

The district court found the West Virginia statue to be virtually identical to
the Nebraska statute at issue in Stenberg.24 s In finding the two statutes virtually
identical, the court found that the Stenberg decision guided and controlled the
evaluation of the constitutionality of the West Virginia partial birth abortion ban. 248
First, the court found that the D &X procedure "may have certain
advantages over the D & E for some patients. 247 In fact, a reading of the court's
decision could lead one to presume that it believed that the D & X is a superior
procedure to the D & E.248 Yet, almost immediately after touting the advantages of
the D & X, the court admitted that the D & X "has not been the subject of
comparative clinical trials and that there is no data comparing it to other
procedures." 249 The court admitted this in response to sworn statements presented
by the State describing risks of the D & X procedure.2 5' However, the court seemed
to brush this part of the state's argument aside. 251 The court determined that the
possible benefits of the D & X procedure militate in favor of allowing the physician
discretion to use the D & X if he or she feels it is proper.25 2
Moreover, the district court found the West Virginia ban on partial birth
abortion unconstitutional in two areas. First of all, the court felt that since the West
Virginia ban failed to contain a health exception, the statute violated the U. S.
Constitution.253 The court stated that "a statute that bans the D & X procedure
creates a significant health risk [to women] and must therefore provide an

24S

See id. at 682.

246

See id. at 684.

247

Daniel, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 684.

248

In his opinion, Judge Goodwin stated the following:

The D & X procedure may reduce the risk of uterine perforation because it can eliminate
the insertion of sharp instruments into the uterus, and because the fetus passes through
the birth canal intact. In a D & E, in which the physician disarticulates the fetus, sharp
instruments and sharp fetal fragments may damage the woman's uterus. A D & E
requires repeated passes with the suction curette and the forceps, which can perforate
the uterine wall. Further, a D & X may result in less blood loss and less trauma for some
patients and may take less operating time, thus reducing anesthesia needs.
Id. at 684.
249
Id. at 684-85.
250

Those risks include future cervical incompetence, risks of uterine perforation and cervical damage,

and concluding that other abortion procedures were at least as safe. See Daniel, 102 F. Supp. at 685.
251

Judge Goodwin stated the following: "The lack of controlled medical studies and the conflicting

medical evidence do not, however, demonstrate that the partial birth abortion ban does not need a health
exception. Rather, they demonstrate uncertainty, a factor that signals the presence of risk, not its absence."
See id.
252

The district court emphasized that physicians often differ in their assessment of health risks and

appropriate treatment, and that there is judicial need to tolerate the differences in those opinions. See id.
253

See Daniel, 102 F. Supp. at 684.
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254
exception for the preservation of the health of the woman."
Second, the court found that the West Virginia statute was
unconstitutionally vague.256 It concluded that the statute prohibited the D & E
procedure as well as the D &X procedure. 256 As such, the court stated that the
physician risked prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment for performing not
only partial birth abortions, but D & E abortions as well.25' Since the court
concluded that the West Virginia statute encompassed both the D & X and D & E
procedures, a substantial burden on the woman's right to choose an abortion
existed. 25 8 The court then permanently enjoined and restrained the State of West
Virginia from enforcing its ban on partial birth abortion. 5 9

VI. AFrERSTENBERG: REDRAFrING A CONSTITUTIONAL PARTIAL BIRTH
ABORTION LIMITATION

Probably the most obvious and important question left after the dust has
settled is "can partial birth abortion truly and effectively be banned?" The most
obvious answer is "nobody knows for sure." Several scenarios must occur before
we know. The first, and most obvious, step is that a state legislature must redraft
and reenact a statute banning partial birth abortion. Second, and most importantly,
that statute must be subjected to judicial review to determine if it passes
constitutional muster.
However, those who support partial birth abortion have long insisted any
ban on the procedure is unconstitutional. Pro-choice advocates maintain that partial
birth abortion bans are unconstitutional because they impose an undue burden on
the woman's right to choose an abortion. 260 These bans, they maintain, are too
overbroad because they ban not only the partial birth 26abortion
procedure, but
1
impermissibly encompass other forms of abortion as well.
Further, these commentators maintain that partial birth abortion bans are
22
unconstitutionally vague, and therefore, violate physicians' due process rights.

254

Id. at 685.

255

See generally Daniel, 102 F. Supp. at 685-86.

256

See id. at 685.

257

See id. at 686.

258

See Daniel, 102 F. Supp. at 686.

259

See id.

260

See generally Strossen and Borgmann, supranote 64, at 7-9.
See id. at 6 (authors maintaining that partial birth abortion bans do not pinpoint a single, specific

261

abortion procedure, but potentially encompassed the safest and most common forms of abortion). See also
Andrews, supra note 16, at 533 (stating that partial birth abortion bans are vague and overly broad, implicate

other abortion procedures, and could encompass conventional D & E procedures and some inductions).
262
See Strossen & Borgmann, supra note 64, at 10.
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Physicians' due process rights are violated, they contend, because the particular
state bans don't provide physicians with enough notice as to what type of procedure
is prohibited, and impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to police, judges
and juries for resolution, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application.2 " 3 Also, they maintain that partial birth abortion bans are
they do not differentiate between abortions that
constitutionally invalid because 264
post-viability.
and
preplace
take
Further, pro-choice advocates also feel that partial birth abortion is one of
the safest and most common abortion methods. 6 5 As such, they feel that partial
birth abortion bans compromise women's health by limiting physicians' discretion
2
to choose the most medically appropriate abortion procedure for their patients. 6
Lastly, they maintain that partial birth abortion bans do not further the state's
legitimate interest in safeguarding potential life and women's health, and in fact
have the opposite effect.267
Yet, other commentators feel that a ban on partial birth abortion is
constitutionally possible. For those seeking legitimacy in their efforts to ban partial
birth abortion, they need only to look to the words of Justice O'Connor in her
concurring opinion in Stenberg.266 However, other commentators feel that partial
birth abortion can constitutionally be banned for reasons apart from the ones
enunciated by Justice O'Connor. 269
Regardless of one's view of the correct constitutional approach to banning
partial birth abortion, if the holding of Stenberg means anything, states are free to
draft statutes banning the procedure. According to Justice O'Connor in her
concurring opinion, "a ban on partial birth abortion that only proscribed the D & X
method of abortion and that included an exception to preserve the life and health of
263

See id.

264

See Andrews, supra note 16, at 533.

265

See Strossen & Borgmann, supra note 64, at 10.

See id; see also Andrews, supra note 16, at 532 (author maintaining "[a]t the very least, 'partialbirth' abortion statutes force women to take unnecessary medical risks, subordinating the life of the woman to
the life of a non-viable fetus.").
See Strossen & Borgmann, supra note 64, at 14.
267
266

268

See generallyStenberg, 120 S.Ct. at 2620 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

269

See e.g., Steven Grasz, If Standing Bear Could Talk... Why There is No ConstitutionalRight to

Kill a Partially Born Human Being, 33 CREIGHTON L. REv. 23 (1999). The author first points out that the
woman's right to abort a fetus, as defined by Roe v. Wade, applies to the unborn. See id. at 26-27. Thus, he
argues, the right to an abortion is limited only to fetuses that are in utero. See id. at 28. To bolster his point,
the author pointed out that a federal court noted that there is no precedent regarding the treatment of partially
bom human beings. See id. at 28 (quoting Carhart,972 F. Supp. at 529). Since abortion typically occurs in
utero, the recognition of a heightened legal status for partially bom children is not inconsistent with either
Roe or Casey. See id. at 30. Roe, the author pointed out, held that unborn fetuses are not persons under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 32. Once the fetus is partially outside the womb, logically, it can no longer
be termed as unborn. See id. Consequently, he maintained that the Supreme Court should not add partially
born children to "the infamous list of those considered 'non-persons.' "Id. at 29. Since the partial birth of a
fetus is a significant event in the eyes of the author, the fetus then becomes a person under the definitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment and entitled to all the protections afforded by it. See id. at 33.
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the mother would be constitutional ... ,270 In O'Connor's view, such a statute
would not place an "undue burden" on the woman seeking an abortion. 1
In redrafting a statutory ban on partial birth abortion, the drafter must take
into account the Casey analysis. In other words, the ban must not place an undue
burden on the woman's right to choose an abortion by placing a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. 2 Clearly, banning partial birth
abortion can fairly be said to place some kind of burden on the woman's abortion
choice. 273 However, the Casey Court stated that "[tihe fact that a law which serves
a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental
effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot
be enough to invalidate it." 274
Therefore, banning partial birth abortion is not meant to strike at the
woman's right to access an abortion. Nor can such a ban be said to be a slippery
slope toward the eventual outlawing of abortion. Only the overturning of Roe and
its progeny can accomplish that. A ban on partial birth abortion serves only to
proscribe one little-used,272756 particular type of abortion that many state legislatures
find unnecessarily cruel.
However, the Casey undue burden test is not the only consideration the
drafter must consider. Other considerations are vagueness of the statute and the
inclusion of a health exception. This commentary will consider each factor in turn.
A.

A ProposedPartialBirthAbortion Limitation

As stated earlier in this commentary, the West Virginia partial birth
abortion ban was located in the Woman's Access to Health Care Act of the West
Virginia Code.277 The author strongly urges the West Virginia Legislature to repeal
the partial birth abortion ban found in Chapter 33, Section 42 of the West Virginia
Code. Once done, the Legislature should enact another statute limiting the use of
partial birth abortion. The proposed statute that follows is based on the Stenberg

270

concurring).
Stenberg, 120 S.Ct. at 2620 (O'Connor, J.,

271

See id.

272

See Casey,505 U.S. at 877.

273

See Gough, supra note 184, at 206.

274

Casey,505 U.S. at 874.

275

See Gough, supra note 184, at 206 (stating that "the D & X abortion procedure ...is the least

employed method of aborting a pre-viability fetus.").
See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 198 n.6 (citing Am. Sub. H.B. 135, 121st General Assembly (Ohio
276
1995)). Interestingly, the district court in Voinovich commented that Ohio's interest in preventing cruelty was
intertwined with its interest in the potential life of the fetus, and it would be illogical for a state's interest in
preventing cruelty to animals to be considered legitimate while its interest in preventing cruelty to human
fetuses would not. See Voinovich,911 F. Supp. at 1071.

277

See W. VA. CODE §§ 33-42-1 to 8.
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decision, the proposed 1995 federal ban on partial birth abortion,278 the original
West Virginia partial birth abortion ban, and other scholarly works. The sections
that follow contain a proposed limitation on partial birth abortion, to be placed in
Chapter 61 of the West Virginia Code. 9
§ 61-13-1. Legislative findings and purpose.
The Legislature finds and declares that it is necessary to repeal the
previous prohibition against partial-birth abortion due to constitutional infirmities.
Nevertheless, the Legislature finds and declares that the State of West Virginia has
280
a profound interest in protecting potential human life from unnecessary cruelty.
Therefore, the Legislature finds and declares that partial-birth abortion is a
particularly cruel procedure, the performance of which inflicts unnecessary cruelty
on the fetus. To that end, the Legislature finds and declares that a constitutional
prohibition against partial-birth abortion is necessary to further the State's interest.
§ 61-13-2. Definitions.
(1) "Partial birth abortion" means an abortion procedure, known as
Dilation & Extraction (D & X), intact Dilation & Extraction (intact D & X), or
intact Dilation & Evacuation (intact D & E), where the physician performs a totally
intact vaginal delivery of a fetus up to the level of the fetal head followed by an
incision made into the fetal skull to permit the removal of the intracranial contents
by suction in order to collapse the fetal skull before completing the procedure. 281
(2) "Physician performing a partial-birth abortion" means a doctor of
medicine or osteopathy legally authorized to practice medicine and surgery in West
Virginia, or any other individual who is legally authorized by the state to perform
abortions: Provided, That any individual who is not a physician or not otherwise
legally authorized by the state to perform abortions, but who nevertheless282directly
performs a partial-birth abortion, is subject to the provisions of this article.
(3) "Dilation & Evacuation" means an abortion procedure, also known as
the D & E, whereby the physician dilates the mother's cervix by any means, grabs a
278

See HR 1833 Hearingat 209-11.

279

Chapter 61 of the West Virginia Code is titled "Crime and their Punishments." The author

proposes amending that chapter by adding a new section, to be designated section 13. This new section would
be dedicated solely to the new limitation on partial birth abortion in West Virginia. The reason for placing the
proposed limitation in this chapter of the W. Va. Code is to further provide notice to physicians that
performing an unnecessary partial birth abortion is a criminal offense.
280
See generally H. 135, § 135, 121st Gen. Ass. (Ohio 1995) (the Ohio General Assembly declared
that its interest in enacting the D & X ban was to prevent unnecessary cruelty to the fetus); see also Bopp &
Cook, supra note 77, at 33. The authors state that partial birth abortion bans are "rationally related to a
legitimate state interest in preventing cruelty to living beings. In a society where great care is taken to prevent
cruelty to animals, there is as legitimate a state interest in preventing cruelty to human beings who are nearly
bom." See id. at 33-34.
281

See generally Gough, supra note 184, at 204.

282

See W. VA. CODE § 33-42-3(4) (1998).
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fetal extremity, dismembers the fetus in utero, and removes the fetal parts, and uses
suction at any stage of the procedure to remove any fetal tissue or collapse the fetal
skull by removing the intracranial contents in order to complete the procedure.
(4) "Any other abortion procedure" means any abortion procedure
currently recognized by the medical community, to include suction curettage,
induction, hysterotomy, or hysterectomy.

§ 61-13-3. Partial-birth abortions prohibited; criminal penalties; civil
penalties; exceptions; hearings by state board of medicine.
(a) Any physician who knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and
thereby kills a human fetus is guilty of a felony and shall be fined not less than ten
thousand dollars, nor more than fifty thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both fined and imprisoned. 28' This section shall apply only to a
physician who knowingly or intentionally performs a partial birth abortion as the
initial procedure. 264 This section does not apply to a partial-birth abortion that is
necessary to save the life or preserve the health of a mother when her life or health
is endangered by a physical disorder, illness, injury, or complication arising during
the pregnancy or from the performance of the initial abortion procedure.
(b) The father, the mother, and if the mother has not attained the age of 18
years at the time of the abortion, the maternal grandparents of the fetus, may obtain
appropriate relief in a civil action, unless the pregnancy resulted from the plaintiff's
criminal conduct or the plaintiff consented to the abortion. Such relief shall include:
(1) money damages for all injuries, psychological and physical,
resulting by the violation of this section; and
(2) statutory damages equal to three times the cost of the partial
birth abortion. 285
(c) A physician charged pursuant to this section may seek a hearing before
the West Virginia Board of Medicine on the issue of whether the physician's act
was necessary to save the life or preserve the health of a mother. The findings of
the board of medicine are admissible on this issue at the trial of the physician.
Upon a motion by the defendant, the court shall delay the beginning of trial for not
more than thirty days to permit the Board of Medicine hearing to take place. 28 6
(d) No woman may be prosecuted under the provisions of this section for
having a partial-birth abortion, nor may she be prosecuted for conspiring to violate
the provisions of this section. 287

283

See W. VA. CODE § 33-42-8(a) (1998).

284

See Gough, supra note 184, at 206.

285

See generallyHR 1833 Hearingat 210.

286

See W. VA. CODE § 33-42-8(b) (1998).

287

See id. § 33-42-8(c) (1998).
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§ 61-13-4. Defenses.
(a) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section, which
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, that the partial birth abortion
was performed by a physician who reasonably believed:
(1) the partial birth abortion was necessary to save the life or
preserve the health of the mother; and
(2) no other procedure would suffice for that purpose.
(b) It is an affirmative defense to a civil action under this section, which
must be proven to a preponderance of the evidence, that the partial birth abortion
was performed by a physician who reasonably believed:
(1) the partial birth abortion was necessary to save the life or
preserve the health of the mother; and
(2) no other procedure would suffice for that purpose.
§ 61-13-5. Procedures not prohibited.
This Act shall not prohibit the performance of the Dilation & Evacuation
abortion procedure or any other abortion procedure.289
B.

Statutory Vagueness

In properly drafting a partial birth abortion ban, the drafter must ensure
that the statute will survive an attack that it is unconstitutionally vague. It is a basic
principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions
are not clearly defined. 290 Vague statutes offend several important values. 291 First,

because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct,
we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. 29 Vague statutes may
trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.293 Second, if arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, statutes must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them. 2 4
Even though the Stenberg majority did not mention the term vagueness, it
did, nonetheless, invalidate the Nebraska statute partially on that basis. The
majority stated "even if the [Nebraska] statute's basic aim [was] to ban D & X, its
288

See generallyHR 1833 Hearingat 211.

289

See Gough, supranote 184, at 205.

290

See Planned Parenthood v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 135 (3rd Cir. 2000) (quoting Grayned v. City of

Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)).
291

See id.

292

See id.

293

See id.

294

See id.
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language makes it clear that it also covers a much broader category of procedures.
The language does not track the medical differences between D & E and D & X...
29 The statute was unconstitutional
The plain language covers both procedures.""
because the "substantial portion" language did not permit one to distinguish
between the D & E procedure, where a foot or arm is drawn through the cervix, and
D & X, where the body up to the head is drawn through the cervix.2 Because the
statute did not distinguish between the two procedures, it placed an undue burden
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.297
1.

The Procedure to be Specifically Banned

This proposed Bill should satisfy the "vagueness" question. First of all, the
statute specifically defines the procedure to be banned. Section 61-13-2(1)
specifically describes partial birth abortion as the "D & X," "intact D & X," or
"intact D & E" procedure. Next, along with naming the procedure, it specifically
describes the procedure that is prohibited. To ensure that no misunderstanding
occurs, the statute adds a new section, § 61-13-5. In this section, the new statute
specifically states that the ban "shall not prohibit" the D & E procedure.
Much of the vagueness problems of previous partial birth abortion bans
was that the D & X and D & E procedures are similar enough so that many courts
found that the bans effectively encompassed both procedures. As such, courts
invalidated such statutes as unconstitutional under the Casey undue burden
standard. 2 98 The proposed language is meant to eliminate any question about what
procedure the ban is to cover.
2.

The Intent Element

Next, the proposed statute retains an intent element. Many state partial
birth abortion bans lacked any kind of intent element.29 For example, in previous D
& X litigation, a Michigan district court stated that "a lack of an explicit intent
requirement . . . makes [a] statute particularly susceptible to ambiguous
interpretation and unpredictable enforcement." 3 mThe original West Virginia statute
contained a specific intent element, in that the physician had to knowingly perform
a partial birth abortion. 30 1 Section 61-13-3(a) of the proposed West Virginia ban
retains that specific intent element, requiring the physician to knowingly perform a
295

Stenberg, 120 S.Ct. at 2614.

296

See id.at 2613.

297

See id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877).

298

See Gough, supra note 184, at 202.

299

See, e.g. Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1307-1308 (Michigan's partial birth abortion ban lacked an intent

standard).
30

Id at 1308.

301

W. VA. CODE § 33-42-8(a) (1998).
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partial birth abortion that is subject to the Act.
C.

The Civil Damages Element

Unlike the original West Virginia statute, the proposed statute adds two
new features. First, the proposed statute contains a section for the father or the
mother of the fetus, or the parents of any unemancipated female who receives a
partial birth abortion, to recover civil damages. The proposed civil penalty is found
in sections 61-13-3(b)(1) and (2) of the proposed statute. It is the author's feeling
that if any partial birth abortion ban is to have any meaning in the future, the
physician should suffer potential economic loss, as well as the loss of freedom, for
the performance of an unnecessary partial birth abortion.
However, one must expect opposition to the proposed statute from prochoice advocates. One of the first arguments such groups would make is that the
civil provision will cause physicians not to perform the D & X procedure when it
could be the most proper in some instances. Because physicians will not perform
the procedure, it will effectively remove the D & X procedure as an abortion
option. Therefore, an undue burden would exist.
However, the Casey decision addresses that argument. Recall that the
Casey Court said "not every law which makes a right more difficult to exercise is..
. an infringement on that right . . . . The fact that a law which serves a valid
purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of
making it more difficult
or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be
302
enough to invalidate it."
A civil penalty element does not strike at the heart of the abortion right. It
only provides an avenue of recovery for the father of a fetus or the parents of a
mother on whom a partial birth abortion was wrongly performed. Also, the
provision arguably limits the class of plaintiffs who could bring an action. Triple
damages only apply to the cost of the wrongful partial birth abortion. Furthermore,
the standard does not take away the option of performing a partial birth abortion.
The health and "life of the mother" exceptions expressly forbid that. True, the
standard may make the D & X procedure more expensive for a woman. But, that
point is arguable, and under the Casey analysis, a civil penalty provision that could
make the D & X procedure more expensive to attain is not enough to invalidate the
statute.30 3
D.

The Affirmative Defense Element

The second new feature of the proposed West Virginia ban is that it adds
an affirmative defense provision in section 61-13-4. This section is based upon the
original 1995 federal ban on partial birth abortion that passed both houses of

302

Casey, 505 U.S. at 873-874.

303

See id.
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Congress and was subsequently vetoed by President Clinton. 304 The author's
rationale for adding an affirmative defense section is similar to those for adding the
civil penalty. With the exceptions that the Supreme Court articulated for any future
partial birth abortion bans, it is arguable that the performance of partial birth
abortions would be as widespread as if there were no ban at all. Therefore, it only
makes sense to force the physician to be absolutely sure that the D & X procedure
is necessary and to prove his reasons for performing it. Similarly, if, as proponents
of partial birth abortion claim, the D & X procedure is the safest procedure in many
instances, there should be enough data and enough experts available to the
physician to prove his defense.
Again, pro-choice advocates might predictably oppose the affirmative
defense element of the proposed statute. One of the main arguments those
advocates might make is that the affirmative defense provision will cause
physicians not to perform the D & X procedure when it could be the most proper in
some instances. Because of the prospect of having to prove the reasonableness of
his actions in a future trial, physicians would be deterred from performing a D & X
in any circumstance. Because physicians will not perform the procedure, it will
effectively remove the D & X procedure from the woman as an abortion option.
Therefore, an undue burden would exist. However, the answer to that argument is
the same as the one the author made in support of the civil penalty provision.
An affirmative defense provision does not strike at the heart of the abortion
right. The provision merely forces the physician to be sure the performance of a
partial birth abortion is necessary, that the decision was made in good faith, and
requires him or her to articulate that good faith reason in court. The standard does
not take away the option of performing a partial birth abortion. The health and "life
of the mother" exceptions expressly forbid that. True, the standard may make the D
& X procedure more difficult to attain for a woman. Again, that point is arguable
under the Casey analysis. That it may make the D & X more difficult to attain is
not enough to invalidate the affirmative defense element. 305
However, an additional consideration exists of which the drafter must be
aware. When crafting an affirmative defense provision, the drafter must ensure that
it does not violate the physician's Due Process rights. Therefore, we must start with
the simple premise that the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires
the prosecutor to persuade the factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime charged. 3° It is also a long accepted rule that the
Constitution permits states to require defendants to prove affirmative defenses as it
sees fit.307 The drafter must ensure, however, that the affirmative defense provision
does not burden the defendant with disproving any of the elements of the crime that

304

See Hearing,supra note 278.

305

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 873-874.

306

See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-364 (1970).

307

See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,211 (1977).
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the state must prove. 0 8
The affirmative defense provision of the proposed West Virginia statute
does not burden the physician with disproving any of the elements of the Act.
Section 61-13-3(a) of the Act requires the state to prove that the physician
"knowingly and intentionally" performed a partial birth abortion as the initial
procedure beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, if the physician performs a D & X
procedure as the initial procedure, he must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
reasonably believed the procedure was necessary to preserve the life or health of
the mother. Therefore, in that instance, the affirmative defense provision merely
"constitutes a separate issue on which the defendant is required to carry the burden
3' 9
of persuasion.

E.

0

The Health Exception Provision

As this commentary already pointed out, the Stenberg Court stated that any
future ban on partial birth abortion requires a health exception for the mother to be
constitutional. Unlike the previous West Virginia partial birth abortion ban, section
61-13-3(a) of the proposed statute provides a health exception. This section allows
the D & X procedure to be performed to safeguard the life and health of the mother.
Under the proposed statute, the physician has discretion to use appropriate medical
judgment should he feel that the use of the D & X procedure is necessary.
Therefore, the partial birth abortion ban only affects a seldom-used abortion
procedure.310 Since the D & E procedure is the most widely used second trimester
abortion procedure, it cannot be said that banning a procedure that is used in only
3000 to 5000 of the approximately 1,221,585 abortions each year places a
substantial burden in the path of a woman. 11 Such a contention is buttressed by
Justice O'Connor who said "it is unlikely that prohibiting the D & X procedure
alone would amount in practical terms to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking
an abortion. 312
However, the proposed West Virginia partial birth abortion ban goes
308

See U.S. v. Petty, 132 F.3d 373, 378 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that an affirmative defense must be

sharply distinguished from a simple defense, or a simple negation of one of the elements of the offense,
because the defendant never bears the burden of proof on the elements of the offense).
Patterson,432 U.S. at 207.
310

See Radloff, supra note 2 (about 3000 to 5000 partial birth abortions are performed every year).

311

See id. at 1588 n.14 (D &E procedures account for 85% of all second trimester abortions).

However, even the data on the number of second trimester/pre-viability abortions is conflicting. According to
Dr. Carhart's brief before the Supreme Court in Stenberg, the D & E procedure "is the most common method
of pre-viability second trimester abortion, accounting for approximately 96% of all second trimester abortions
in the United States. See LeRoy Carhart, Briefof Carhartet al. in Stenberg v. Carhart, 16 ISSUES L. & MED.
35, 41 (2000). If we take Carhart's 96% figure, this means that the D & E was performed in 1,172,722 of the
1,221,585 abortions performed in 1996. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note
1.Given those figures, this leaves 48,863 abortions where other procedures were used. If one uses the higher
number of the estimated 3,000-5,000 partial birth abortions performed 1996, that leaves 43,863 abortions that
were non-D & E, non-D & X.
312

Stenberg, 120 S.Ct. at 2620 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 884).
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further than providing the necessary health exception. Section 61-13-3(a)
specifically states that only when a physician performs the D & X procedure as the
initial procedure does he or she become subject to the Act. The statute would not
apply, then, to a scenario where the physician begins to perform a D & E procedure
and complications arise such that the D & X becomes necessary to safeguard the
life or health of the mother. 313
F.

BalancingIrreconcilableInterests

Careful drafting of a statute to avoid vagueness and the addition of a health
exception is the tip of the iceberg in the attempt to ban partial birth abortion. Much
of the problem is that many courts have concluded that partial birth abortion is the
safest possible late-term abortion method. 14 The question becomes which is
supreme: the woman's interest in the safety advantage of the partial birth abortion
procedure, or the state's interest in the prevention of cruelty and dehumanization of
the fetus?
The partial birth abortion ban suggested in this commentary balances the
interests of all involved. First, it provides protection for the physician. The statute
clearly defines the procedure to be proscribed: the D & X, the intact D & X, and the
intact D & E procedure. It describes the procedure and bans it by name. Therefore,
the physician is on notice as to the procedure that is proscribed. Further, the statute
specifically states that the ban is not meant, and should not be construed, to ban any
other abortion procedure but the partial birth abortion procedure. Also, the
physician is further protected because the statute bans partial birth abortion only as
the initial procedure. Therefore, the physician has the flexibility to switch to it
should a complication arise in the performance of another procedure, such as the D
& E.
Second, the statute provides protection for the woman. The statute
specifically provides exceptions for the life and health of the mother. In this way,
she is protected should unforeseen complications arise during the performance of
another abortion procedure. The statute also would allow the physician to use his
best medical judgment should he feel that the D & X is the only appropriate
procedure to safeguard the woman's life or health. Further, the statute bans the first
use of the D & X procedure with the woman's future health in mind. Specifically, it
bans the initial use of a procedure that could expose the woman to significant
health risks, and the risk of not being able to complete another pregnancy in the
future.
For opponents of partial birth abortion, the statute accomplishes what they
313

See generally Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1308 (describing a case where a physician, intending to

perform a D & E procedure, reaches into the uterus to dismember the fetus and the fetus, still intact, slips
through the cervix up to the neck, necessitating the performance of a D & X; thus, a permitted procedure
quickly becomes an illegal procedure).
314

In Carhart,the district court held that Nebraska's partial birth abortion ban would likely not meet

Casey's undue burden standard, not because it was vague, but rather because it eliminated an abortion method
that the court determined was the safest second trimester abortion procedure. See Carhart,972 F. Supp. at
524-525.
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want. First, the statute bans the use of partial birth abortion as the initial procedure.
Also, it provides for incarceration and fines as punishment for violation of the Act.
Second, it requires the physician to prove at trial that his decision to use the partial
birth abortion procedure was due to an accident or based on a sound, good faith
medical judgment. And, perhaps most importantly, the legislative findings section
reiterates the state's profound respect for potential human life, while decrying
partial birth abortion as a "particularly cruel" procedure.
Further, the ban cannot be said to strike at the heart of the abortion right.
The focus of the statute is entirely on the fetus. 315 This statute does not seek to
preserve the life of the fetus, but rather, it seeks to limit the method by which the
life of the
fetus may be terminated so that it is not subjected to unnecessary
3 16
cruelty.
Moreover, the statute does not seek to strike at the woman's ultimate right
to terminate her pregnancy by banning a majority of pre-viability abortions.317 The
statute merely takes away one abortion procedure from initial use, while providing
exceptions should its use become necessary. At best, the partial birth abortion
319
procedure accounted for 5,000318 of the 1,221,585 abortions performed in 1996.
In other words, the amount of partial birth abortions performed in the U.S. is
statistically zero. Given that statistic, can a ban on the first use of such a seldomused abortion procedure be called a slippery slope to eventually overturning Roe
and its progeny?
In deciding the constitutionality of any future partial birth abortion ban, a
court should be guided by the words of Justice Stevens. In his partial concurrence
and partial dissent in Casey, he stated, "A state-imposed burden on the exercise
of a
320
constitutional right is measured both by its effects and by its character.,
VII. CONCLUSION

No matter on which side the reader falls, the debate between proponents
and opponents of partial birth abortion is far from over. However, a statutory ban
on the initial use of a rarely-used abortion procedure cannot be held to strike at the
heart of the abortion right itself. With the guidance of Stenberg and Casey, states
should redraft partial birth abortion bans that balance the interests of all who wish
to maintain or abolish partial birth abortions.
Many good people on both sides of the abortion debate believe that
individuals may differ in the arena of ideas over partial birth abortion. Reasonable
315
316

See Gough, supranote 184, at 212.
See id.

317

See id.

318

See Radloff, supra note 2.

319

See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 1.

320

Casey, 505 U.S. at 920.
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people on all sides of the partial birth abortion debate can find common ground in a
properly drafted ban. A properly drafted statute can ban the partial birth abortion
procedure and only that procedure. A properly drafted statute can protect the future
health and lives of women by providing exceptional use of partial birth abortion. A
properly drafted statute provides notice to physicians as to what procedure is
specifically banned. A properly drafted statute reaffirms the state's "compelling
interest" in potential human life. The Supreme Court has spoken. Now, it is time
for the states to act.
Todd Goud"
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